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In contrast to the US experience, most international (European) real 
estate investments trusts (REITs) are subject to prudential regulation.  
This paper investigates the effects of prudential regulation on capital 
structures and  consequently, the REIT share values of major legal and 
market constraints (i.e. leverage limitations, market discount on net 
asset value (NAV), tax controls) that affect non-US REITs. Italian 
market data are used for an empirical analysis. 
Our hypothesis is that in a constrained environment, the effects on 
share price significantly depend on the adopted valuation perspective,  
i.e. if shares are valued by following a NAV or a financial approach. The 
logic for this hypothesis is that the two valuation methodologies 
perceive leverage and implied financial risk differently. In particular, we 
argue that NAV valuation techniques incentivise REITs to maximize 
leverage regardless of the financial theory which indicates a 
contrasting impact of debt on the market value of shares. Differences in 
financial risk perception could also partially explain market price 
discounts on NAVs. 
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The empirical results seem to support these expectations. Almost all 
Italian REITs tend to increase debt ratios over time. NAV discounts are 
significantly related to leverage. The discount effect is largely 
attributable to NAV increases that result from rising debt levels. On the 
contrary, share market prices tend to be independent from leverage. 
The latter result may indicate that the classic capital theory applies and 
current debt ratios do not imply bankruptcy risk. The results have 
significant policy implications in terms of an optimal regulatory design. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The literature on REIT capital structures largely considers tax issues – the 
requirement for REITS to pay out high percentages of taxable income in 
return for enjoying tax free status at the entity level – as the major constraint 
on financial options of managers, by de facto, reducing their choices to debt 
and equity financing1. This status is consistent with the American market 
context to which most bibliography is related. 
 
In contrast, most European public REITS and comparable investment vehicles 
(real estate investment funds, real estate trusts, etc.) are subject to severe 
prudential regulation and vigilance mainly aimed to protect retail investors. In 
particular, regulation typically limits the leverage ratio of REITS and defines 
the mandatory legal structure of the investment vehicle. However, the high 
regulatory burden is normally largely off-set by a favorable fiscal status of 
REITs that are normally recognized as tax-free or tax preferred entities2. At 
the same time, market evidence from various countries (e.g. Italy and Great 
Britain) shows that public REITS typically trade at (deep) discounts on net 
asset values (NAVs). 
 
The fact that European REITs are not constrained-free investment structures 
from several perspectives suggests that investigation of how the legal context 
affects the capital structure of REITS should not be limited to tax issues, but 
also take into consideration, the broader provisions of prudential regulation.  
                                                          
1
 For a recent summary of capital structure theories applied to REITs, see Feng et al. 
(2007). 
2
 For an international overview and comparison of the various REIT structures, the 
reader may refer to Ernst & Young (2007). 
Regulatory and Market Constraints of REITs    284 
 
 
In this context, the objective of the study is to investigate the effects on capital 
structure, and consequently, on share values of the major legal and market 
constraints that affect (European and, in particular, Italian) REIT operations.  
 
Three primary controls are considered: (1) leverage limitations; (2) the tax 
regime, and (3) market price discount on NAVs. NAV discount is not a 
constraint per se; however, as addressed next, the combination of this 
phenomenon with the regulatory imposition of NAV as the mandatory 
valuation criterion for assessing REIT share values results in a de facto 
limitation of the financial choices of managers3.  
 
Our key point is that how these legal and market factors influence the capital 
structure of REITs, and therefore share price, significantly depends on the 
adopted valuation perspective, i.e. if shares are valued following a NAV or a 
financial approach. In particular, we argue that from an asset-based (NAV) 
valuation approach, the above mentioned controls incentivise REIT managers 
to maximize leverage because of the positive effect of debt on share value 
under the NAV criterion. This positive effect occurs even though financial 
theory would indicate that – from a market perspective – too much debt could 
have a negative impact on the market value (MV) of shares consistent with 
the perception of financial risk. Such perception is not captured by the NAV –
valuation standard, based on the book value of debt. Moreover, if NAV and 
financial methodologies perceive leverage and price the implied financial risk 
differently, these differences in valuation perspectives could partially explain 
market price discounts (in addition to other factors) on NAVs. 
 
The above-described hypothesis with regards to the effects of legal and 
market constraints on REIT capital structures and share values are empirically 
tested. The investigation is based on Italian public REIT data which reported 
daily market prices and half-yearly NAVS for the entire (22) public REIT 
population from late 1999 (upon listing date) through to December 2007. We 
first estimate debt trends for all REITs in order to check the basic assumption 
of increasing leverage ratios over time due to the regulatory constrained 
environment. We then investigate and test for the relationship between 
leverage dynamics and REIT share price discounts to reported NAVs by a 
regression analysis. Regressions are independently repeated for the two NAV 
discount components (NAV and market price as dependent variables) in order 
to control for the factor that leads to discount movements of NAV. 
 
Based upon the financial framework outlined in Section 3, we expect debt 
levels to increase over REIT maturity. Leverage should also be positively 
related to NAV discounts due to the different financial risk perceptions of 
NAVs and market prices. The NAVs of REITs should increase as debt ratios 
rise; leverage effects on market prices (assumed to follow a financial 
perspective) are more questionable. Moreover, NAV discounts should be 
                                                          
3
 As for Italy and Great Britain (see Table 1). 
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more strongly related to debt for older than younger REITs, under the realistic 
assumption – as the Italian case – that REITs established via cash 
contributions invest in equity capital first. 
 
The positive correlation between NAV discounts and debt could, however, be 
mitigated by the decreasing residual life of closed-end REITs. This is under 
the severe assumption that NAVs and market share prices tend to converge as 
the REITs approach maturity. This tendency (together with others) is verified 
by a cluster analysis. 
 
The results of the study seem to support initial expectations.  
 
In fact, the outcomes show that because of the legal design of REITs, debt 
increases over time for all REITs. Leverage is positively related to NAV 
discounts both in the short- as well as in the long-run; the correlation 
coefficient tends to be greater for older REITs and lower for younger REITs. 
NAV discount variations seem to be determined by NAV changes rather than 
market price reactions to leverage increases. 
 
These results have relevant policy implication both at REIT (i.e. limitations in 
investment capacity and NAV discount magnification) and the industry levels 
(i.e. potential multiplication of REIT structures, and inherent transaction and 
intermediation costs), and suggest amendments to the prudential regulatory 
rules. In particular, consideration should be given to abolition of the 
mandatory NAV valuation methodology.  
 
While the empirical results are based upon the analysis of Italian market data 
and the Italian regulatory regime, they may apply or also be adopted by other 
European countries that have similar market and regulatory situations (e.g., 
Great Britain). 
 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the legal 
and market contexts of the principal REIT regimes in Europe; the outline 
particularly focuses on the Italian regulatory and market structures. This focus 
is important in order to highlight the main constraints (leverage limitations, 
market price discounts on NAVS, and taxation) that are addressed in the 
following analysis. Section 3 summarizes the main theories on capital 
structures that could explain the behavior of managers in defining financial 
options and suggests a theoretical analysis of how legal and market 
constraints alter financial choices. It concentrates on the effects of the 
forecasted, constrained capital structures on REIT share values both from a 
NAV and a financial perspective. The study’s hypotheses are tested in Section 
4 where data are described and an empirical analysis of the Italian market 
evidence is conducted. Conclusions are drawn in the final section. 
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2. Regulatory and Market Environments of European 
REITS 
 
Most European countries have introduced real estate investment trusts or 
comparable investment vehicles (all of which are termed “REITS”) in recent 
years. As Table 1 shows, two main characteristics are notable4.  
 
(1) Almost all REIT regimes impose a prudential regulation generally aimed 
to protect retail investors to whom (public) REITS are generally targeted. 
Prudential regulation refers to investment restrictions and leverage 
limitations. Investment policies usually impose a minimum real estate 
portfolio diversification by limiting asset concentration; leverage 
restrictions are usually expressed in terms of a maximum debt-to-real 
estate assets ratio (around 60% on average). No business model seems to 
dominate the type of organization found in European countries, with 
REITS being organized either as corporations or open/closed-end trusts. 
Although closed-end REITs have a finite life, they are in most cases, 
allowed to redeem outstanding shares and issue new equity during their 
life5. As described below, a key regulatory feature that applies in some 
countries and affects REIT financial structures, involves share valuation 
standards. Italy and Great Britain, for example, require REIT shares to be 
valued on the NAV6 criterion; REITs are therefore obliged to regularly 
publish (on a semiannual or yearly basis) the NAV of the property 
portfolio, with the assets appraised by independent appraisers. Moreover, 
the same valuation requirement applies also to new share issues despite 
market price premiums or discounts on NAVs7. As explained next, even 
if often considered a minor detail, this requirement has important 
implications in terms of the financial choices de facto available to REIT 
managers.  
                                                          
4
 A detailed overview of the various REIT regimes is depicted in Appendix 1. Table 1 
summarizes their main characteristics. 
5
 With respect to market level, it is notable that most REIT structures are public, listing 
are required in order to promote share liquidity and allow, in the case of closed-end 
vehicles, investment way-out. Private REITs are usually reserved by regulation to 
institutional investors [Appendix 1]. 
6
 The NAV essentially consists of the current aggregate value of total assets (which are 
real estate values estimated by independent appraisers) less the total liabilities of the 
company.  
7
 U.K. REITs qualify as an investment or trading company.  Only investment entities 
must respect listing rule LR15, which states that “…closed-ended investment fund may 
not issue further shares of the same class as existing shares for cash at a price below 
the NAV per share of those shares unless they are first offered pro rata to existing 
holders of shares of that class.” [FSA (2008)]. 
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Investment Vehicle's Structure, Main Regulatory Provisions, and Taxation 
REIT's 
Structure Main Regulatory Constraints Taxation 
Country Year 
Open-
end (*) 
Closed-
end (*) 
Investment 
Limitations 
Leverage 
Limitations 
NAV Mandatory 
as Share Valuation 
Method 
Mandatory Pay 
Out Rules Reit's Income 
Belgium (Sicafi) 1995 Yes -- Yes Yes No Yes 
Tax-exempt 
(Pass-through 
entities) 
France (Siic) 2003/2005 Yes -- Yes Yes No Yes Tax-exempt 
Germany(G-Reits) 2007 Yes -- Yes Yes No Yes Tax-exempt 
Italy (i)  
(Fondi Immob.- Reits) 1994-1998 -- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No/Upon articles 
of association Tax-exempt 
Italy (ii) (Siiq) 2007 Yes -- Yes No No Yes Largely tax-exempt 
Netherlands (FBI) 1969 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes (100%) Tax-exempt 
UK (UK-Reits) 2007 Yes -- Yes Yes Yes Yes (100%) Tax-exempt 
Notes: (*) Open-end / Closed-end refers to the substantial classification of the REIT structure, not to the legal form. From a regulatory point of view, 
no REIT is structured as an open-end entity. 
Table extracted from data reported in Appendix 1. Sources are reported in the same Appendix. 
Table 1 Overview of European REITs 
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(2) The severe regulatory burden is largely compensated by a favorable tax-
status of REITS in all investigated countries. Subject to national 
differences, real estate investment vehicles are normally considered as 
pass-through entities at the entity level, while different taxation rules 
apply at the investor level mainly based on whether the investors are 
retail investors or institutions, with small investors being generally taxed 
at preferred brackets. With a few exceptions (Italy), compulsory pay-out 
ratios are imposed in order for the entities to benefit from reduced 
taxation (see Table 1)8. Taxation affects capital structure by influencing 
the cost of debt, varying cash-flows available for investments, and 
altering the entity’s valuation.  
 
The favorable fiscal and supervisory framework has enabled European REITs 
to establish themselves as a dominant investment vehicle for financial real 
estate. As depicted in Table 2, at the end of 2007, the market capitalization of 
public REITs in the five selected countries amounted to Euro 104.7 billion9,10, 
which is equal to 73.4% (compounded) of the local listed real estate market 
[AME (2007), Italian Stock Exchange (2007)]. 
 
Table 1 The European REIT Market 
December 2007 
Listing Country Number of Companies 
Sector Mkt Cap 
bn Euro 
% of Local Listed 
Real Estate 
Belgium 14 4.1 78.8% 
France 32 48.4 81.4% 
Germany 2 0.6 2.8% 
Netherlands 7 9.0 78.5% 
Great  Britain 18 36.6 55.7% 
Italy 22 6.0 49.4% 
Overall 95 104.7 73.4% 
Sources:  
AME Capital, Global REIT Research, December 2007. Data used with permission.  
Italian Stock Exchange, National Companies Capitalisation, December 2007.  
Adaptations by the authors. 
 
                                                          
8
 Pay-out requirements are usually based on the ordinary net income of a REIT, while 
profits from the disposal of assets are commonly not subject to mandatory distribution 
[Appendix 1]. 
9
 Data were obtained by using the average GBP/Euro exchange rate of December 2007 
available on the Bank of Italy website. 
10
 Data do not consider German REITs and Italian SIIQ (Real Estate Listed 
Corporations), depicted in Table 1. German REITs were established in 2007. At the 
end of 2007, only two German REITs were listed in the German Stock Exchange; 
market capitalization was limited to Euro 712 million (April 2008) [Deutsche Börse 
(2008)]. At the same year end, only one Italian SIIQ (Real Estate Listed Corporation) 
was listed.   
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Market evidence is characterized by another key feature relevant to capital 
structures of public REITs: the market prices of REIT shares deviate from 
their NAVs (which show premiums or discounts on NAV). Market behavior is, 
however, quite differentiated at the national level; Italian and British 
investment vehicles, that account for almost 40.7% of the European REIT 
market, typically show persistent price discounts on NAV (Figure 1 and Table 
3), while French, Belgian and some Dutch REITs quote at premium (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 1 FTSE EPRA UK Index - NAV Discount 
 
 Source: EPRA, News N. 25, March 2008. 
 
 
Figure 2 NAV Premium: France, Netherlands and Belgium (2007) 
100.78
29.37
28.8
0 20 40 60 80 100
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Percentage (%)  Source: Global REIT Report-REIT Market Review 2007, Ernst & Young, October 2007. 
 
Irrespective of the precise size of market price deviations from NAV, the 
circumstance that most REITs – in terms of market capitalization – trade at 
discount is particularly relevant if combined with the regulatory provision that 
oblige REITs to refer to NAV for reporting share values and issuing new 
equity. In fact, in the presence of persistent discounts, the misalignment 
between (higher) NAVs and (lower) market prices de facto impedes new 
equity issues due to the mandatory NAV reference. In that sense, we will refer 
to this limitation as a “market constraint” hereafter. Based upon Figure 1 and 
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the figures in Table 3, market constraint seems to be a major concern for 
Italian and British REITs. 
 
Table 2 Average NAV Discount of Italian REITs (2007) 
REIT Average NAV Discount 
Fondo Alpha  11.48% 
Atlantic 1 28.46% 
Berenice-Fondo Uffici  16.54% 
Fondo Beta   1.20% 
Bnl Portfolio Immobiliare  21.07% 
Caravaggio  20.98% 
Estense-Grande Distribuzione  17.38% 
Immobilium 2001  28.25% 
Invest Real Security  28.76% 
Investieco  28.26% 
Nextra Immobiliare Europa - Caam Europa 38.22% 
Nextra Sviluppo Immobiliare – Caam Italia  32.83% 
Obelisco  21.73% 
Olinda-Fondo Shops  24.14% 
Piramide Globale  22.80% 
Polis  26.82% 
Portfolio Immobiliare Crescita  11.79% 
Securfondo  23.63% 
Tecla Fondo Uffici  13.68% 
Unicredito Immobiliare Uno  30.96% 
Valore Immobiliare Globale  26.00% 
 REIT Average NAV Discount 22,62% 
 REIT Weighted Average NAV Discount 21,50% 
Source: Assogestioni, Report December 2007. Adaptations by the authors, and 
Italian Stock Exchange. 
 
 
2.1 The Italian REITs 
This paper principally relies on the characteristics of Italian public REITs11,12. 
The REITs are structured as closed-end investment funds externally 
administered by a so-called management (or investment) company upon 
                                                          
11
 As previously indicated, the analysis does not consider the only recently introduced 
SIIQ, due to the fact that at the end of 2007, only one SIIQ was quoted. We will refer 
to Italian real estate investment funds as REITs hereafter. The question of their legal 
nature has marginal relevance for the issues investigated in this paper. The regulatory 
set of the present section mainly refers to regulations promulgated by the Bank of Italy 
(2005). 
12
 Public REITs are typically addressed to retail investors. Prudential regulation is 
relaxed for so called institutional or qualified REITs reserved for professional and 
institutional investors. For a detailed regulatory description, please refer to Bank of 
Italy (2005). 
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mandate of the investors that are participating in the fund13. The REIT itself 
has no board of directors, but the articles of association must provide for a 
potential general shareholders meeting with authority to change the 
management company14. This provision is intended to mitigate agency costs 
inherent in the intermediation model and limit opportunistic behaviors of the 
investment company. Mandatory equity participation of the management 
company is limited to 2% of the fund’s share capital. Notwithstanding the 
ineffective minimum amount chosen, the rule promotes an alignment of 
interests between investors and managers.  
 
The investment company’s compensation is generally stated as a percentage 
of the fund’s NAV; however, management fees are also frequently based on 
the gross asset value of the fund15. Additionally, performance fees may be 
charged.  
 
Closed-end refers to the finite life of the investment vehicle (limited to a 
maximum of 30 years16), with REITs being entitled to raise additional equity 
capital and redeem existing shares17. Investors may contribute in cash (as 
usually the case for public REITs) or real estate assets; particular protection 
rules apply to asset contributions made by the investment company (or related 
parties) which manages the fund in order to safeguard the interests of 
investors from the embedded conflicts of interest.  
 
REITs are subject to investment limitations and asset tests in order to qualify 
and be authorized as REITs by the supervisory authority. REITs must invest 
at least 2/3 of their assets in real estate, with no single property representing 
more than 1/3 of the total assets (the so called “concentration test”)18. On the 
liability side, leverage limitations impose a maximum debt-to-real estate ratio 
of 60%, with the denominator being defined as the MV of the properties 
assessed by independent appraisers on a semiannual basis 19 . Potential 
violations of these rules result in compliance risk. We refer to regulatory debt 
restrictions as “leverage limitations”. 
                                                          
13
 The investment companies are entitled to manage several REITs. 
14
 This provision applies to REITs established from 2003 onwards. Older REITs were 
not requested to have a shareholders meeting. 
15
 At the end of 2007, 12 (55%) of the 22 listed Italian REITs state the management fee 
as a percentage of NAV; 10 (45%) as a percentage of asset under management. 
16
 Duration of most REITs is limited to a 5 to 20 year range. REIT life is stated in the 
articles of association. 
17
 These provisions have to be stated in the articles of association. 
18
 Other specific rules and exceptions apply. For regulatory details, please see [Bank of 
Italy (2005)]. 
19
 Assuming real estate investments only, the debt-to-equity ratio is therefore equal to 
1.5. The leverage ratio, defined as the total asset value divided by the equity value, 
would amount to 2.5. 
Further limitations apply to the debt-to-non real estate asset ratio. REITs may leverage 
up to 20% of financial assets assessed at fair value [Banca d’Italia (2005)]. 
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Contrary to most European (and US) REIT regimes, Italian real estate 
investment funds enjoy a favorable tax status without being subject to 
mandatory payouts. The preferred taxation is provided in order to off-set the 
severe prudential regulatory burden. REITs are considered pass-through 
vehicles at an entity level in the sense that income from both current 
operations and asset dispositions is tax-exempt. At the investor level, 
distributed dividends and capital gains on REIT shares are subject to a 12.5% 
withholding tax for individual shareholders, and considered corporate income, 
and therefore subject to regular tax rates for non-individual shareholders. It is 
noted that the withholding tax for individual investors is the same for long-
term debt and equity investments.  
 
No mandatory payout rules apply at the REIT level; the periodic dividend 
distribution is therefore determined by the management company in 
accordance with the articles of association of the REIT which normally 
impose minimum payout ratios. Anecdotal evidence shows that distributable 
income generally excludes non-realized gains that are derived from real estate 
appraisal values, i.e., from positive value differences of properties between a 
current period and the initial reporting period. Tax rules consequently do not 
represent a constraint for Italian REITs. However, as shown in the following 
sections, the tax rules are fiscal constraints in the sense that even if tax 
treatment does not influence the amount of retained earnings available for 
investments – as for most other REIT regimes in Europe and the United 
States – it affects REIT capital structures via the cost of debt. In that sense, we 
will speak of “tax controls”. 
 
In order to increase share liquidity and provide shareholders with a market for 
disposition, listing on the stock exchange within 24 months from the initial 
public offering is mandatory for retail or public REITs, defined as funds with 
a share face value below Euro 25,000. Due to their limited average size, 
trading characteristics and liquidity features, REITs are considered small-cap 
stocks. 
 
Summary statistics of the Italian REIT market are reported in Table 4 which 
shows assets under management and net assets of both public and private 
investment vehicles. At the end of 2007, 109 REITs had been established: 27 
(24.8%) were registered as retail REITs, 22 of whom were already listed on 
the Italian Stock Exchange; and 82 (75.2%) were incorporated as private 
(institutional) REITs. Overall, assets under management and net assets 
accounted for Euro 31.4 billion and Euro 19.1 billion, respectively, 
comprising 87.2% of the total assets invested in real estate. Public REITs 
managed Euro 10.4 billion of assets (equal to 33% of the industry’s total); net 
assets amounted to Euro 7.4 billion after subtracting a debt of Euro 3.0 billion, 
equal to a debt-to-equity leverage ratio of 40%; and based on REIT market 
capitalization, the debt ratio amounted to roughly 50%. Public REITs tend to 
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be widely held by retail investors and larger in terms of assets under 
management than private vehicles, most of which are constituted by asset 
contributions from a few professional or institutional shareholders. At year-
end 2007, public REITs had an average size (in terms of assets under 
management) of Euro 385.2 million compared to the Euro 256.1 million of 
private REITs. Market prices of public REIT shares were 21.5% below NAV, 
on average. This circumstance, in conjunction with the regulatory obligation 
of pricing new equity issues, regardless of market price dynamics, and on the 
basis of NAV, makes initial public offerings difficult since no potential buyer 
will pay a NAV-based price when the market price is lower.  This requirement 
limits the financial options available to REIT managers, and therefore, their 
investment opportunities. 
 
Table 3 Italian REITs 
Assets Under Management 31.4 100.0% 
Public REITs 10.4 33.1% 
Private REITs 21 66.9% 
Net assets 19.1 100.0% 
Public REITs 7.4 38.7% 
Private REITs 11.7 61.3% 
N° of REITs 109 100.0% 
Public REITs 27 24.8% 
Private REITs 82 75.2% 
Note: Values in billion Euros and percentage. 
Source: Assogestioni, Report December, 2008. 
 
 
3. Capital Structure and Legal and Market Constraints 
 
Financial sources are represented by debt, equity, and retained earnings. The 
optimal combination of those sources, both at an absolute and a relative level, 
has been widely investigated in the economic literature, mainly as a function 
of tax levies and bankruptcy costs, on the one hand, and of agency costs and 
adverse selection problems, on the other hand. The first variable set basically 
refers to the classic capital and tradeoff theory, the second body of factors is 
addressed by agency and pecking order literature. Other theories may apply as 
well. The results are still controversial and from our point of view, not yet 
conclusive when discussing the capital structures of firms and in particular, 
REITs. The following outline therefore simply attempts to define a general 
body of financial theories that may be useful for interpreting at a conceptual 
stage how the three above mentioned major legal and market constraints – (1) 
leverage limitations, (2) market price discounts on NAVs, and (3) tax 
controls – affect REIT capital structures, and consequently REIT share values. 
However, our key point is that in doing so, we need to perform a separate 
analysis of the effects that the constraints produce on market value and NAV 
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of REIT shares. This is due to the fact that the two values reflect alternative 
valuation approaches (a financial methodology and a static, asset-based 
approach, respectively), which perceive capital structure decisions that are 
induced by the above mentioned constraints, differently. Should market prices 
and NAVs react differently, NAV discounts (or premiums) would 
consequently be affected20.  
 
We first investigate the effects of tax controls on REIT capital structures from 
a general perspective (Section 3.1.). We then consider how the market 
constraint limits the effective financial options to debt (Section 3.2.1.). We 
finally highlight how the regulatory leverage limitations lead to sub-optimal 
financial structures with respect to a constrained-free environment (Section 
3.2.2.) and how non-optimal solutions generate different effects on market 
prices (financial approach) and NAVs (asset-based approach). The two 
valuation perspectives are integrated in Section 3.3. 
 
3.1 Tax Controls 
 
The financial theory suggests that there is a tradeoff between the benefits and 
the costs of debt [Zeng et al. (2007)], where debt competes with equity in 
allocating the operating income of a firm. Advantages derive from tax savings 
due to fiscal deductibility of interest payments, while risk shifting towards 
lenders, exposes the firm to bankruptcy and related costs. Balancing the two 
contrasting factors enables the identification of a target capital structure, at 
least over the long run.  
 
In particular, under the extreme assumption of the absence of explicit or latent 
bankruptcy costs and the presence of taxes at the corporate level, the 
investment vehicle should maximize debt in order to fully exploit tax shelters 
[Modigliani, Miller (1963)]. 
 
In the opposite hypothesis of a tax-free corporate environment (i.e., taking 
into account the first of the above-mentioned REIT constraints defined as 
“tax-controls”) while allowing for financial distress and inherent costs, debt 
has no significant advantage over equity. This is clearly the case of REITs that 
are generally classified as tax-free entities and potentially exposed to 
insolvency risk from leverage. In the presence of non-trivial bankruptcy costs, 
and also in consideration of negative fiduciary externalities associated with 
the collapse of highly regulated investment entities such as REITs, equity 
should therefore generally be preferred to debt, at least over the long run and 
for raising debt levels that significantly increase the probability of default 
[Howe, Shilling (1988)]. In particular, higher debt ratios should gradually lead 
to higher costs that are not off-set by debt benefits. Thus, high and rising debt 
levels negatively impact share value, ceteris paribus.  
                                                          
20
 Most of these considerations apply to public retail REITs while only applicable to 
private vehicles under specific, stated circumstances. 
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However, should the default probability be considered low, even for relative 
high debt ratios due to the collateral value of the firm’s assets [Titman, 
Wessels (1988)] – as might be the case for REIT investment in real estate – 
financial distress may play a minor role. In this case, capital structure would 
move toward the classical model in which financial leverage has no effect on 
the REIT cost of capital and thus on the value of the REIT [Modigliani, Miller 
(1958)]. This case is particularly relevant if there is no difference in tax 
brackets between debt and equity investments for retail and individual 
investors to whom public REITs are marketed. This describes the Italian case, 
with both asset classes levied at the same rate of 12.5%. This parity allows 
simplification of the relative advantages of debt and equity at both the entity 
and investor levels [Myers (1984)]. 
 
Empirical evidence is, however, contrary to the prediction of low levels of 
debt induced by the tax exemption’s disincentive for leverage: 2007 market 
data of public Italian REITs show an average debt level, measured as debt-to-
equity ratio, of almost 50% (see Section 2). In addition, as described next in 
more detail, leverage tends to increase over time for almost all REITs. The 
reasons for this circumstance are controversial and require consideration of 
other factors, such as asymmetric information and agency costs which could 
explain REIT leverage, even in a tax-free context, and positive REIT stock 
price reactions to debt offerings [Howe, Shilling (1988)]. 
 
The presence of debt might be explained by asymmetric information between 
firm managers and their equity investors within an agency relationship [Myers, 
Majluf (1984)]. In particular, leverage – especially in the form of standard 
debt [Diamond (1983)] – provides incentives to managers to select investment 
projects that will enable the firm to meet debt service and dividend payment 
obligations, which reduce cash-flow available for other projects that are not in 
the best interests of their shareholders. Similarly, high dividend payouts also 
serve to reduce agency costs by limiting the financial freedom of managers 
[Bradley et al. (1998)]. An alignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers may also be favored, under certain conditions, by a non-trivial 
equity capital participation of the REIT directors which limit their incentives 
for opportunistic behaviors because they would prejudice their own interests 
[Friday et al. (1999)].  
 
If the agency theory applies, debt could contribute – at least for certain, limited 
amounts – to the disciplining of managers to meet shareholder interests and 
reduce monitoring costs. Under this hypothesis, leverage should not 
necessarily lead to lower valuations. Also, the tangible nature of real estate 
assets, which have active second-hand and well functioning markets [Myers, 
1984], could allow for relative low-risk, secured debt. This may permit 
managers to rationalize a moderate level of borrowing [Titman, Wessels 
(1988)]. 
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From a financial perspective, the experience of Italian REITs seems consistent 
with this view of leverage because of agency costs, conflicts of interests 
intrinsic to the externally managed, closed-end investment vehicle, and the 
limited amount of equity required by regulation to be invested by the 
management company. In addition, public REITs are typically addressed to 
widely dispersed and non-professional retail investors; the monitoring and 
performance evaluation of directors are therefore weak and largely rely on 
broad reputational and market discipline [Friday et al. (1999)].  
 
The pecking order theory is also related to asymmetric and privileged 
information [Myers (1984)]. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest an ordinal 
preference of financial sources for managers. They suggest that managers 
prefer retained earnings, issue debt as second best, and issue equity only as a 
last resort as a function of the relative value perception of securities by 
external investors with respect to manager information. However, the pecking 
order theory as well as the choice between debt and equity requires access to 
all financing sources (retained earnings, debt and equity). Given the 
regulatory and market constraints on Italian REITs, this condition is not 
relevant. In fact, in a controlled context, debt recourse could simply reflect a 
lack of financial alternatives. 
 
3.2 Regulatory and Market Constraints  
 
We argue that the assertion that leverage could simply express the lack of 
financial choices is derived from a combined interaction of leverage 
limitations, the evidence of REIT shares traded at discount on NAVs, and the 
imposition of NAV as a mandatory valuation standard. As described next, this 
combination narrows funding options available to managers by generating a 
suboptimal financial context with respect to a constraint-free environment. 
Our explanatory hypothesis also assumes that: (1) REITs usually have no 
positive net present value (NPV) opportunities available on a long-term basis. 
While there may be positive NPV investments available from time to time, 
given the relative market depth for institutional core real estate, zero-NPV 
opportunities should be the normal case, (2) REITs do not change their 
investment policy in terms of operational risk. REIT directors are, in fact, tied 
to the investment risk profile stated in the articles of association, (3) REITs 
raise debt after having invested all initial equity capital. In fact, as described 
in Section 2, most public Italian REITs are established via cash contributions. 
In the initial stage, they are therefore pure equity REITs with no debt. The 
collected equity is used to acquire real estate assets. REITs start to leverage 
only after having invested this initial equity in order to capture new 
investment opportunities. As depicted, the debt-to-(real estate) asset ratio is 
capped at 60%, and finally, (4) debt is basically represented by “bullet 
financing”, in which the borrower (the REIT) makes only annual interest 
payments, but no principal reimbursements until the single-maturity date of 
the loan.  
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3.2.1 Market Constraint 
As previously outlined, Italian REITs trade at deep discount from NAVs. This 
fact would not be a particularly relevant matter if REITs were free to 
endogenously determine the price for new equity issues based upon market 
conditions. However, as already depicted, Italian REITs are forced to refer to 
NAVs when issuing new shares. If REIT shares trade at discount, this 
circumstance makes the issuance of new equity unfeasible due to the fact that 
share buyers are not willing to pay the (higher) NAV price, and prefer to buy 
the shares in the secondary market (at lower prices). 
 
This circumstance limits the financial options available to REIT managers to 
retained earnings and debt. This limitation also makes it highly questionable 
that directors select these funding sources based on the pecking order theory. 
 
3.2.2 Regulatory Constraint 
Italian REITs, consistent with the international experience, generally have a 
policy of high dividend payouts determined in the articles of association, so 
accrued earnings also represent a limited financial source 21 . In addition, 
retained earnings are usually insufficient to finance new real estate 
investments due to the high values of most real properties, at least for Italian 
REITs. The REIT articles of association usually do not allow distribution of 
unrealized capital gains that are derived from periodic revaluation of 
properties. These unrealized profits significantly reduce available cash-flow to 
a level below net income and greatly exceed the contrary non-monetary 
depreciation expense effect [Bradley et al. (1998)]. In addition, should REIT 
managers deliberate at their discretion (as actually allowed by the articles of 
association of some REITs) variations in earning retention policies, this would 
have potential agency cost implications. Investors would have difficulties in 
accurately attributing deviations in cash-flows to the actions of the managers 
or factors beyond the control of the managers [Bradley et al. (1998)]. 
 
Debt seems therefore to be the only relevant funding option available to REIT 
managers to raise additional external capital to finance new investment 
opportunities.  
 
How does debt affect capital structures, and therefore, share values, 
considering the lack of financial alternatives (i.e., equity, and for the large part, 
retained earnings) combined with the overall regulatory set (i.e., leverage 
limitations and NAV valuation standards)?  
                                                          
21
 16 (73%) of the listed REITs foresaw in their articles of association, payouts with 
percentages usually in a range between 70% and 90% or determined by the 
management company (2007) while 6 (27%) did not [Assogestioni (2008)]. Note, 
however, that the management company is always entitled to suspend the dividend 
distribution in the interest of the shareholders.  
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Our hypothesis is that the effects are ambiguous, given the valuation approach 
followed – financial versus NAV. 
 
(i) Financial Approach 
In consideration of the financial methodologies, we have at least two 
alternative explanatory effects.  
 
If the classical trade-off theory applies, any significant debt level would have 
no positive effect on the REIT value in a tax-free context [Maris, Elayan 
(1990)] nor would it eventually negatively influence share value in 
consideration of the probability of financial distress associated with 
leveraging. The theory assumes the circumstance of zero-NPV investments. 
However, in consideration of the nature of REIT assets (which can easily be 
used as collateral), agency relations and bankruptcy costs, REITs may be 
expected to issue debt [Titman, Wessels (1988)], at least for certain amounts, 
and seek a balance between management incentive and distress costs.  The 
reasoning is that after having invested all initial equity, a REIT faces new 
investment opportunities (assumed to have zero-NPV and an expected internal 
rate of return (IRR) equal to that already being achieved by the assets in place) 
under equity capital rationing (because of the “market” constraint)22. Should 
the REIT use debt funds, and if so, up to what amount? Given the collateral 
value of real estate, the REIT could probably issue low-risk debt obligations 
up to a certain level without significantly altering its expected probability of 
default. In addition, a certain debt level may also provide the discipline for 
REIT directors to effectively and efficiently manage, thus positively 
influencing net cash-flows. Relatively low levels of debt are therefore 
expected to potentially lower the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
over the short run and therefore, increase the value of the REIT as compared 
to a suboptimal (all-equity) capital structure. Beyond some threshold level of 
debt, the positive effects are counteracted by the potential costs of financial 
distress that rise as the level of debt increases. We can expect REITs, 
therefore, to be able to identify, at least over the long run, a desired capital 
structure with leverage ratios that minimize WACC and maximize asset and 
share value. 
 
This is a relevant differentiating point with respect to the asset-by-asset NAV 
valuation methodology that is discussed next. In a capital structure formed 
under the financial valuation methodology, an optimum debt level exists, at 
least theoretically; also, it eventually fluctuates over time due to short-term 
adjustments [Myers (1984)]). When the optimal leverage level is reached, the 
REIT should pass up new investment opportunities because a sub-optimal 
WACC would tend to lower share values.  
                                                          
22
 Remember that most Italian REITs are established via cash-contributions as “all-
equity” REITs. 
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When debt limitations exist, as for REITs, two situations of interest may arise 
with respect to the effects of regulatory and market constraints on capital 
structures and share values from a financial perspective. 
(1) The optimal debt (D) to asset (A) ratio may be lower than permitted by 
regulation [D/AOPT < D/AREG]. In this case, the REIT would stop 
investments and leverage before reaching the maximum allowed debt-to-
asset ratio. This result occurs because the regulatory debt-to asset ratio is 
suboptimal in financial terms with respect to the capital structure that is 
endogenously defined. However, the REIT would be limited in its 
investment capacity compared to a constraint-free environment. This is 
due to its inability to issue new shares in order to maintain the desired 
optimal capital structure. This inability is determined by the mandatory 
NAV reference values for equity offerings, combined with the severe 
market price discount on NAVs. 
(2) The optimal debt-to-asset ratio may be higher than the regulatory 
maximum level [D/AOPT > D/AREG]23. The legal constraint prevents the REIT 
from achieving the most favorable capital structure, which implies a 
higher WACC than the firm value maximizing capital structure. In turn, 
this generates a negative price effect on share values with respect to the 
predictable (higher) market price induced by the optimal leverage ratio of 
the REIT.  
Regulatory leverage limitations would in that case be detrimental to the (retail) 
investors who are presumably protected by the same prudential regulation. 
This paradoxical situation would not be an Italian peculiarity, but applicable 
to most European REIT regimes that have analogous leverage limitations (see 
Table 1). 
 
(ii) NAV Approach 
In the NAV approach, a REIT share value consists of the value of the property 
portfolio, based on the appraised MV of the underlying real estate assets, 
minus the liabilities of the company usually considered at a nominal value, 
divided by the number of issued shares [Veld, Hughes, 2008]. Debt affects 
NAV share values in a substantially different way than it does from a 
financial perspective. We argue that this is a key point and has severe 
implications.  
 
The reasoning is as follows. Suppose that we have an all equity REIT already 
fully invested in real estate facing (at the beginning of the year) new 
investment opportunities to be financed with debt. In the first stage, zero-NPV 
investment opportunities should have no effect on NAV because of the same 
value added to both sides of the REIT balance sheet. That is, the same value 
                                                          
23
 A debt-to-asset value of around 60% (equal to a loan-to-value ratio [LTV] of the 
same amount), as chosen by many European REIT regulations (see Appendix 1) might 
not be abnormally risky because of the usually core institutional real estate quality of 
public REIT assets.  
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of the asset (i.e., the MV of the acquired property that is assumed to be 
equivalent to the acquisition price [P] due to the zero-NPV of the investment 
project) also appears on the liability side (i.e., the nominal debt value issued 
for financing the P). So, the investment project does not immediately alter the 
NAV of the REIT, but modifies the debt-to-asset or equivalently, the debt-to-
equity ratio. However, the investment opportunity is expected to contribute to 
the profit of the REIT by increasing (marginal) earnings by an amount equal 
to the expected positive difference between the total operating return [rOP]) of 
the property and the cost of debt [rD]24. In turn, this leads to an increase in 
NAV at the end of the year, with all other things being equal, because of the 
positive accounting income effect of the zero-NPV investment opportunity.  
 
Additional debt-financed investment projects with analogous expected NPVs 
and IRRs as the assets are already in place would continue to increase the 
NAV of the REIT from an accounting perspective. Their marginal 
contributions are expected to be always positive, also at decreasing rates, but 
entice managers to take advantage of every available investment opportunity. 
Of course, this investment trend implies increasing leverage ratios, and in turn, 
higher marginal interest rates (assuming that creditors are aware of the rising 
risk), increasing debt, and its cost up to the abstract point where the cost of 
debt equals the operating return of the property. At the balance sheet level, 
this situation would theoretically occur at the point where the NAV of the 
REIT is equal to zero. 
 
Earnings distributions would subsequently reduce NAV by the amount 
dispensed; the retained portion increases net assets and prolongs the finite 
debt-financed investment process by marginally increasing the financial 
                                                          
24
 Note that the single, marginal real estate acquisition is 100% debt financed (debt-to-
asset ratio equals 1). However, at the portfolio level of a REIT, the debt-to-asset ratio 
is lower than 1 due to the initial equity collection (i.e., in the initial stage, the REIT is 
“all-equity”). 
For low levels of leverage, the cost of debt might be lower than the expected return on 
the property because the lender counts on recourse to the financed asset’s collateral 
intrinsic value and/or on borrower’s other assets. 
To illustrate the process, suppose that there is an all-equity REIT with initial equity (E) 
= 10,000, real estate assets (A) = 10,000, and debt (D) = 0. So, NAV0 = A – D = 
10,000. For simplicity, we do not consider the net income of period 0, which would be 
equal to the return on the investments (ROI) already in place in the absence of debt and 
taxation. The REIT faces a new zero-NPV investment opportunity immediately after t0 
(i.e., at the beginning of year 1). The MV or alternatively, the P of the new investment 
opportunity is 5,000 with rop = .1, equal to the rop of the assets already in place. The 
requested interest rate (rd) = .07 (7%), that is rop > rd. This is because at the REIT level, 
NAV > 0 or, alternatively, D/A < 1. MV is assumed constant over time. The payout 
ratio for period 1 = 0. 
Immediately after acquisition, NAV will not change: A = 15,000, D = 5,000 and NAV0 
= 10,000. In the absence of taxation, the marginal net income contribution (∆NIMARG) 
of the new investment at t1 (end of year 1) will be ∆NIMARG = (rop – rd) × MV = (0.1 – 
0.07) × 5,000 = 150. So NAV1 = 10,000 +150 +1,000 (→ ROI of A0 = 10,000).  
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capability of the REIT. A 100% earnings distribution is unusual, so NAV 
would be expected to increase. 
 
Thus, the relation between leverage and expected investment returns is always 
positive in a NAV-appraised share value regime.  
 
The maximum leverage ratio predicted by the NAV criterion should always 
be higher than that predicted by the financial criterion. Under the financial 
criterion, debt has no effect, or a negative effect, on a REIT share price (trade-
off theory), or positively contributes to a lower WACC only up to the point 
where the manager incentive and agency costs discourage further debt-
financed investment. 
 
3.3 The Effects of Constraints on Capital Structure and REIT Share 
Prices: Integrating the Two Valuation Perspectives 
 
A key concept to note from the analysis heretofore is that the NAV and 
financial share valuation methodologies significantly differ with respect to 
how leverage and implied capital structures are perceived.  
 
NAV is unaffected by the debt ratio in the sense that the REIT share value is 
simply the residual, nominal difference between asset values and debt, 
regardless of the effective capital structure in place. Leverage comes into play 
only when the cost of debt equals or exceeds the property returns. In the 
presence of regulatory leverage limitations, the NAV valuation approach 
always provides an incentive for REIT managers to increase debt up to the 
maximum amount allowed 25 , 26 . In other words, the asset-based valuation 
perspective is basically a property level methodology that simply focuses on 
the MV of the properties held by the REIT and deducts the nominal debt from 
the overall real estate portfolio valuation in order to obtain the NAV of the 
REIT.  
This is clearly not the case from a financial valuation perspective which is a 
firm-level valuation method. Capital structure influences share value via a 
financial risk perception and not – as in the NAV valuation perspective – in 
                                                          
25
 Should appraisers use the discounted cash flow (DCF) methodology and not the 
sales comparison approach to estimate the MV of properties, then, NAV would in 
theory be financial in nature as well, but only at the property level valuation. In fact, 
appraisers use average real estate industry data (where financial risk is not in the MV 
of the appraised asset), while financial analysts employ firm specific data that reflect 
the financial risk embedded in the effective capital structure of the single REIT. So, the 
valuation level and perspective considerably differ.  
26
 The analysis does not consider compliance risk. It arises in the case of market 
turnarounds that reduce real estate asset values below regulatory leverage limitations. 
Should current net cash-flows be insufficient to allow adequate debt reimbursements in 
order to meet the regulatory leverage ratio, REITs could be forced to liquidate 
properties in critical times in order to lower the debt-to-asset ratio below the maximum 
allowed level to avoid regulatory sanctions.   
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pure nominal terms. However, the sign and magnitude of the debt effect might 
vary as a function of the financial theory that best describes REIT behavior. In 
the short run, leverage ratios could be positively or mildly positively related to 
share market prices. This relationship is consistent with the adverse selection 
cost of equity and pecking order theory which stresses the fact that – even in a 
tax free context – cash flow limitation may have a positive effect on share 
value. Should the trade-off theory apply, the correlation between debt and 
share market prices should always be negative. Alternatively, the classical 
theory suggests no effect of debt. 
 
If the NAV of the REIT and market prices are affected differently by leverage, 
this circumstance should also be reflected in market price discounts on NAVs.  
 
We attempt to empirically verify this hypothesis. Our perception is that REIT 
managers follow a NAV maximization approach. This observation is 
supported by at least two considerations. First, the overall regulatory 
framework identifies NAV as the guiding reference value for reporting and 
supervisory purposes. In particular, return performances are usually calculated 
on NAV in, for example, annual and semi-annual reports. Second, 
compensation structures of REIT managers are often based on NAVs; 
directors therefore tend to place more emphasis on NAVs than current share 
prices27.  
 
 
4. Market Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
The above mentioned hypotheses are empirically tested. The investigation is 
based on Italian public REIT data that involve daily market prices and semi-
annual NAV figures for the entire (22) public REIT population. The observed 
time window varies for each REIT as a function of the listing date on the 
Italian Stock Exchange and ends on December 31, 2007. The first observation 
is on November 29, 1999. The number of observations for each REIT time 
series is reported in Table 5. 
 
The most important sources of data for this study are the Italian Stock 
                                                          
27
 These considerations basically only hold for public REITs for which market prices 
are available; private REITs are affected by such considerations only when 
shareholders follow a NAV valuation approach or should they follow a financial 
perspective, in the case that the preferred leverage ratio chosen in a constraint-free 
environment is higher than the maximum regulatory level and the trade-off theory does 
not apply. In the second case, private REITs would be forced to issue new shares in 
order to comply with prudential regulation; equity offerings, however, would generate 
a sub-optimal capital structure from a financial point of view. The share value of the 
REIT would therefore be lower than in the case of a constraint-free context in which 
REIT managers would be allowed to choose the preferred debt level and payout ratio, 
and consequently, the optimal capital structure. 
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Exchange and the Italian Mutual Funds & Investment Firms Association 
(Assogestioni). 
 
Table 4  
REIT Listing Date Market Price Observations 
Fondo Alpha  07/04/2002 1395 
Atlantic 1 03/07/2006 379 
Berenice-Fondo Uffici  07/19/2005 506 
Fondo Beta   10/24/2005 555 
Bnl Portfolio Immobiliare  01/02/2002 1523 
Caravaggio  05/16/2005 669 
Estense-Grande Distribuzione  08/03/2004 869 
Immobilium 2001  10/29/2003 1061 
Invest Real Security  01/24/2005 747 
Investieco  11/01/2004 805 
Nextra Immobiliare Europa (Caam Europa) 11/17/2003 1048 
Nextra Sviluppo Immobiliare (Caam Italia) 06/03/2002 1398 
Obelisco  06/14/2006 392 
Olinda-Fondo Shops  12/09/2004 762 
Piramide Globale  11/26/2002 1293 
Polis  04/20/2001 1700 
Portfolio Immobiliare Crescita  07/01/2003 1146 
Securfondo  02/05/2001 1251 
Tecla Fondo Uffici  03/04/2004 892 
Unicredito Immobiliare Uno  06/04/2001 1669 
Europa Immobiliare 1 14/12/2006 270 
Valore Immobiliare Globale  11/29/1999 2052 
Source: Assogestioni, Report December 2007 
 
 
In constructing the data set, information is collected from different data banks. 
In some cases, we were forced to estimate the daily values lacking (e.g., 
leverage measured as debt-to-asset ratio and NAV figures) by linear 
interpolation. Moreover, the hypothesized explicative variable (debt-to-asset 
ratio) is normalized with respect to the maximum regulatory level admitted in 
order to have the same variation interval with respect to the NAV discount 
and to best perform a cluster analysis. Similarly, in a consistent manner, beta-
regression coefficients are normalized with respect to the highest coefficient28. 
 
We first estimated the debt trend for all public REITs in order to test whether 
leverage follows the (NAV) predicted pattern of increasing debt ratios over 
                                                          
28
 The debt-to-asset ratio is normalized in a range between 0 and 1; beta-coefficients 
are normalized in a range between -1 and 1. 
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time. Based on the theoretical framework outlined in the first part of the paper, 
we expected debt levels to increase over the REIT maturity, which is 
consistent with the NAV valuation standard. The debt trend was estimated 
with an analytical approach29; this methodology is the only feasible one due to 
the limited time period of the available NAV and debt data (semi-annual 
reporting period) that does not allow for the calculation of moving averages. 
 
Second, we focused on the correlation between the debt-to-asset ratio 
(consistently with the regulatory provision) and the market price discounts 
from reported NAVs by time series linear regressions. In particular, we used 
the following (simple) linear regression model: 
NAVDISCt = α + β DEBTt + ε t       (1) 
in which the NAV discount (hereafter, NAVDISC) is regressed on a constant 
and debt-to-asset ratio.  
 
In the model, the term εt is a usual normally distributed error with a zero mean 
and variance σ2ε. The error term is very important in order to consider the 
influence on the dependent variable of other regressors that we omitted in this 
context because not relevant for our purpose30.   
 
 
                                                          
29
 The analytical approach estimates the trend of a variable by identifying particular 
values Tt that can be substituted for the original values registered by the variable 
observed at different times. Let X be the variable of which we want to estimate the 
trend and let xt be the values that X assumes at time t (t = 1,...,N); hence, we obtain the 
values Tt as follows: Tt = a’ + b’t’, 
where: - a’ is the average of the time-series values xt;  
- b’ is obtained by dividing N ( Σi=1:N  t’× xt ) by  N (N 2-1) and  
- t’= t – (N+1)/2. 
30
 In fact, this analysis does not investigate NAV discount determinants per se. 
However, if leverage influences market prices and NAV figures in a different way, 
debt may partially explain for the discounts. In any case, the fact that other variables 
could explain NAV discounts is revealed by term εt in the regression model. As 
commonly known, the first part of the previous equation, such as α+β DEBTt , which 
represents the regression function, explains the average relation that exists between 
NAVDISC and DEBT during the time. So, if we know the value of DEBT, by using this 
regression function, we could forecast a value α+β DEBTt for the dependent variable 
NAVDISC. The error term εt instead incorporates all factors that explain the difference 
between the average value of NAVDISC at time t and the value forecasted by the 
regression function. In particular, this error contains all other factors, which are 
different from DEBT, that cause the value of the dependent variable for a specific time 
t. As a consequence, the value of R 2 obtained by using the regression errors, can also 
be considered as a measure of the omission of relevant dependent variables in the 
model (Stock et. al, 2003). 
For an analysis of other explanatory variables of the Italian REIT NAV discount, 
please refer to (Biasin et al., 2010). The analysis confirms the explicative potential of 
debt. 
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For each analyzed REIT, NAVDISC was calculated by using the following 
formula: 
( )
t
tt
t NAV
PNAVNAVDISC −=       (2) 
where      NAVt = NAV of each share of the ith REIT at time t; 
Pt = market price31 of the ith REIT at time t. 
 
Since the investment assets of Italian REITs are appraised semi-annually by 
independent professional appraisers, we needed to provide acceptable proxies 
for the true daily NAV. To estimate the daily NAVs, we assumed a linear 
trend for each of the six-month period considered.  
 
Moreover, in order to confirm the indications of the empirical results obtained 
via time-series regressions, we performed a panel fixed-effects estimation on 
the parameters of Equation (1). 
 
The basic idea is that the market price discounts on NAVs reflect leverage 
effects in recognition of the different perceptions of debt reflected by market 
prices and NAVs. In contrast to market prices, NAVs do not directly reflect 
financial risks embodied in capital structures.  
 
The type of analysis performed did not allow us to specify the sign and 
intensity of the variation of the two components of NAV discounts (NAV and 
market price) with respect to leverage increases. We therefore used repeated 
regressions, testing for the correlation of the debt-to-asset ratio with NAV and 
market price independently. 
 
Also, in these cases, we used a simple time series linear regression model in 
which the dependent variable – NAV or alternatively, market price – is 
regressed on a constant and debt-to-asset ratio. So, we respectively considered 
the following two models: 
NAV t = α + β DEBTt + ε t      (3) 
and        P t = α + β  DEBTt + ε t           (4) 
 
Based on the theoretical framework outlined in the first part of the paper, we 
expected leverage to be positively related to NAV due to the nature of the 
NAV valuation methodology. From a financial perspective, the effects of debt 
on REIT market prices are more uncertain. Should the classical capital 
structure theory best describe REIT financial behavior, debt could have no 
noticeable effect on market prices. However, if bankruptcy costs come into 
                                                          
31
 The market price is the “official price”, that is, the quantity weighted average price 
of the entire quantity traded in the session, excluding contracts executed with the 
cross-order function. [London / Italian Stock Exchange (2007)]. 
Regulatory and Market Constraints of REITs    306 
 
 
play, the trade-off theory suggests, at least for increasing debt levels, a 
negative correlation. Consistent with manager incentives for increasing debt 
levels and with asymmetric information, leverage could be positively related 
to market price even in a tax-free context, at least in the short run. As before, 
in such cases, we run a panel fixed-effects estimation in order to confirm the 
results obtained via regressions.  
 
In the third stage, we conducted a cluster analysis32, using a nonhierarchical 
method  in order to:  (1) test whether older REITs, which are  presumed to have 
higher debt ratios, are characterized by higher NAV discounts in relation to 
debt, and (2) control for other components that could influence REIT financial 
behavior. In particular, we controlled for the REIT manager fee structure and 
residual lifetime.  
 
Compensations based on total assets, as opposed to NAVs, should lead to 
higher leverage ratios because of the incentive to increase assets, even in 
negative NPV investments. However, the correlation intensity between debt-
to-asset-ratios and market price discounts on NAVs could be mitigated by the 
decreasing residual lifetimes of closed-end REITs. This mitigation would 
occur under the assumption that NAVs and market share prices tend to move 
closer as the REITs approach maturity. 
 
4.1 Empirical Results  
 
The analysis showed a positive trend of leverage (measured as debt-to-asset 
ratio) for almost all REITs 33 . This evidence seems to support the debt 
maximization incentive induced by the combined effect of “market” and 
“leverage” (or “regulatory”) constraints. These constraints are effective 
because of the lack of alternative financial choices, the mandatory NAV 
reference value, and leverage limitations. Moreover, debt ratios are positively 
related to market price discounts on NAVs. 
 
A regression analysis demonstrated that leverage is significantly associated 
with the NAV discount during the time. In particular, the regression 
coefficients shown in Table 6 are positive for almost all REITs and the 
                                                          
32
 Data transformation and normalization are strongly recommended in the analysis of 
clusters because this ensures that the result is independent from the unit used to 
measure the variables. In addition, normalization ensures that all the variables 
contribute to the classification to the same extent.  
In the implementation phase, we used a nonhierarchical method. In particular, we used 
the fundamental k-means algorithm, i.e., the renowned mobile center criteria. During 
the implementation which used SPSS, we achieved the best results by using simple 
Euclidean distance as a proximity measure, and decided to fix the maximum number of 
iterations and the convergence criterion to 200 and 0, respectively.  
33
 Two REITs (Securfondo, Atlantic 1) present a slightly negative trend. These values 
may reflect the analytical approach followed. Debt trend details are available upon 
request. 
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(adjusted) R-Square is always higher than 0.41. For all REITs, the coefficient 
of the independent variable is significantly different from zero at the 
confidence level of 95%, as confirmed by the t-test, and the data are well 
fitted during the time, as shown with the same probability by the F-test34. 
 
The presence of term ε
 t allows the specific relevance of leverage to be 
consistently delineated on the previous note that the discount is a function of a 
set of variables. 
 
 
Table 5 NAV Discount Regression Coefficients 
 beta NAVDISC norm R2 
ATLANTIC 1 -0.197417335 0.776 
BERENICE-FONDO UFFICI  -0.111328507 0.989 
BNL PORTFOLIO IMMOBILIARE -0.111328507 0.596 
CARAVAGGIO 0.048522794 0.45 
ESTENSE-GRANDE DISTRIBUZIONE  0.048522794 0.815 
EUROPA IMMOBILIARE N°1  0.069653688 0.913 
FONDO ALPHA  0.184504011 0.949 
FONDO BETA   -0.05204461 0.954 
IMMOBILIUM 2001  0.414595969 0.41 
INVEST REAL SECURITY  0.122480923 0.698 
INVESTIECO  1 0.556 
NEXTRA IMMOBILIARE EUROPA  0.184112698 0.518 
NEXTRA SVILUPPO IMMOBILIARE  0.187243201 0.955 
OBELISCO  0.074153786 0.982 
OLINDA-FONDO SHOPS  0.0624144 0.952 
PIRAMIDE GLOBALE  0.418704754 0.666 
POLIS  0.395030327 0.415 
PORTFOLIO IMMOBILIARE CRESCITA  0.106045784 0.601 
SECURFONDO  0.355899041 0.869 
TECLA FONDO UFFICI  0.063392682 0.899 
UNICREDITO IMMOBILIARE UNO  0.732537664 0.591 
VALORE IMMOBILIARE GLOBALE  0.154177265 0.601 
 
 
 
In order to confirm the previous results, we also run a panel fixed effects35 
regression on the following model using a panel data set that refers to 2136 
REITs and 379 days37 from July 2006 to December 200738 
                                                          
34
 Data are available upon request. 
35
 We used a fixed effect estimator for the following reasons. First of all, we have a 
closed and exhaustive sample of information. In this situation, fixed effects are the 
natural candidates. Secondly, this estimator has the advantage of effectively capturing 
Regulatory and Market Constraints of REITs    308 
 
 
NAVDISCit = α + β DEBTit + ε it                              (5) 
where the error term is equal to a REIT fixed effect plus a truly idiosyncratic 
term εit = µi + wit.   
 
The fixed effect µi absorbs all variables that are fixed in time plus any other 
fixed in time factors that may be relevant and which we have not explicitly 
considered. We expected the NAVDISC to be positively associated with DEBT.  
 
Results were obtained with STATA 9.2 and are provided in Table 7. 
 
It can be noted in Table 7 that the fixed effect estimator gives the best results 
with respect to the random effect (as also confirmed by a Hausman test) or the 
OLS pooled estimator. 
 
The evidence that NAV discounts increase with rising debt levels is consistent 
with our expectation that NAVs and market prices would react differently to 
leverage. 
 
In particular, the separate regressions on NAVs and market prices show that 
NAVs positively react to higher debt-to-asset ratios in a significant way, while 
market prices are unaffected by leverage, in the sense that the regression 
model of the latter does not show a statistically significant correlation (see 
Table 8)39. It appears, therefore, that increasing discounts of market prices on 
NAVs for rising debt levels are led by positive NAV modifications, and not 
by decreasing share prices in the market that tend to be independent from 
leverage. 
 
                                                                                                          
(or controlling for) all relevant variables that are idiosyncratic to the statistical units 
that are fixed in time (Baltagi, 2005). The data exhibited enough variation in the 
temporal dimension to employ a “within” estimator. Moreover, the least squares with 
dummy variable (LSDV), that is the estimation method in a fixed effects context, is 
BLUE (i.e., the best linear unbiased estimator) if the model is really yit
 
= a + b xit + Σ j=1, N-1 
µ j Dji + εit, if x is weakly exogenous and if εit ~ IID (0, σ2ε) and it is in any case, consistent, 
even if the real model is a random effect model. 
We did not use the recent Driscoll and Kraay procedure [Driscoll (1998)] because our 
testing shows that spatial dependence is very low; so we do not need a more correct 
estimate evaluation of the standard errors. 
36
 A public REIT (Europa Immobiliare 1) has been excluded from the analysis due to 
its very short listing time (December 2006). 
37
 We refer to this time window because it represents the complete common period of 
REIT life starting from the listing day. 
38
 Hence, we worked with 7959 observations to estimate the regression parameters of 
this model. 
39
 For all REITs, the variable coefficient in the regression of NAV on DEBT is 
significantly different from zero at the confidence level of 95%, as confirmed by the t-
test, and the data are well fitted during the time, as shown with the same probability by 
he F-test. 
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Table 6 Results Obtained by a Fixed Effect Estimator Applied to the 
Panel Data. Dependent Variable: NAVDISC  
Regressors Parameter (Standard Error) 
LEV 0.095* (0.0098) 
CONSTANT 0.29* (0.004) 
* = each parameter is significative at 
5% referring to a bilateral test 
Number of observations = 7959 
Number of groups = 21 
Observations for each group = 379 
R2 = 0.39 
Corr(ui xb) = 0.59 
F(1,7937) =94.05 ; Prob>F = 0.000 
sigma_u = 0.08412 
sigma_e = 0.07039 
rho =  0.5881(fraction of variance due to ui) 
F test that all ui = 0; F(20,7937) = 520.50;  
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
 
To support these results, we also run two (separate) panel fixed effects 
regressions on the following models by using the same previous panel data set: 
NAVit = α + β DEBTit + ε it                  (6) 
and  
Pit = α + β DEBTit + ε it      (7) 
We expected the NAV to be positively associated with DEBT while market 
price tends to be independent from DEBT. Results were obtained with 
STATA 9.2 and are provided in Tables 9 and 10. 
 
Also, in these cases, as we can note in Tables 9 and 10, the fixed effect 
estimator gives the best results with respect to the random effect (as also 
confirmed by a Hausman test) or the OLS pooled estimator. 
 
The results also support our perception that REIT managers follow a NAV 
approach which creates incentives for managers to increase leverage, which in 
turn, increases NAV. 
 
From a financial perspective, notwithstanding the limited statistical 
significance of the regression, the results predict an irrelevance of debt with 
respect to market prices. These results appear to be consistent with the 
classical capital structure theory in which leverage does not affect firm value 
in a tax-free context. However, the results are unclear and need further 
investigation. 
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Table 7 NAV and Market Price Regression Coefficients  
 
beta NAV 
Norm R
2
 
beta Market 
Price Norm R
2
 
ATLANTIC 1 0.017933428 0.99 -0.075385351 0.121 
BERENICE-FONDO UFFICI  0.018355296 0.997 -1.284602703 0.67 
BNL PORTFOLIO IMMOBILIARE 0.094748157 0.86 0.084383127 0.33 
CARAVAGGIO 0.088738775 0.83 0.01302565 0.027 
ESTENSE-GRANDE DISTRIBUZIONE  0.209383865 0.68 -0.044722205 0.13 
EUROPA IMMOBILIARE N°1  0.094422491 0.978 -0.345656989 0.4 
FONDO ALPHA  0.324879921 0.95 0.569154522 0.083 
FONDO BETA   0.066033533 0.559 0.067856833 0.31 
IMMOBILIUM 2001  0.808357393 0.45 0.335097509 0.061 
INVEST REAL SECURITY  0.114981674 0.639 -0.057613317 0.094 
INVESTIECO  1 0.55 -0.091812807 0.007 
NEXTRA IMMOBILIARE EUROPA  0.138653954 0.546 0.052297345 0.07 
NEXTRA SVILUPPO IMMOBILIARE  0.182314649 0.95 -0.013906139 0.01 
OBELISCO  0.102307022 0.99 -0.566395833 0.13 
OLINDA-FONDO SHOPS  0.016600315 0.99 0.25183331 0.286 
PIRAMIDE GLOBALE  0.438937402 0.7 -0.09622298 0.07 
POLIS  0.519892425 0.127 0.229224311 0.032 
PORTFOLIO IMMOBILIARE CRESCITA 0.201234314 0.858 0.61652379 0.61 
SECURFONDO  0.635673801 0.96 -0.131725221 0.017 
TECLA FONDO UFFICI  0.019048054 0.99 -0.584380996 0.358 
UNICREDITO IMMOBILIARE UNO  0.809200641 0.67 1 0.474 
VALORE IMMOBILIARE GLOBALE  0.373888431 0.49 -0.279946899 0.21 
 
 
Table 8 Results Obtained by a Fixed Effect Estimator Applied to the 
Panel Data. Dependent Variable: NAV 
Regressors Parameter (Standard Error) 
LEV 168.20* (11.46) 
CONSTANT 2700.67* (4.98) 
* = each parameter is significative at 5% 
referring to a bilateral test 
Number of observations = 7959 
Number of groups = 21 
Observations for each group = 379 
R2 = 0.36 
Corr(ui xb) = 0. 5776 
F(1,7937) = 215.46 ; Prob>F = 0.000 
sigma_u = 1466.12 
sigma_e = 82.07 
rho = 0.5969 (fraction of variance due to ui) 
F test that all ui =  0; F(20,7937) = 93364.97;  
Prob > F = 0.000 
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Table 9 Results Obtained by a Fixed Effect Estimator Applied to the 
Panel Data. Dependent Variable: Market Price 
Regressors Parameter (Standard Error) 
LEV 421.96* (27.44) 
CONSTANT 1867.06* (11.93) 
* = each parameter is significative at 5% 
referring to a bilateral test 
Number of observations = 7959 
Number of groups = 21 
Observations for each group = 379 
R2 = 0.0289 
Corr(ui xb) = 0.5174 
F(1,9737) =236.54 ; Prob>F = 0.000 
sigma_u = 1095.36 
sigma_e = 196.50 
rho = 0.9688  (fraction of variance due to ui) 
F test that all ui = 0; F(20,7937) = 8623.15;  
Prob > F = 0.000 
 
 
The tendency towards higher debt ratios induced by market and regulatory 
constraints is also confirmed by the results of the cluster analysis, as depicted 
below in Table 11 (for details please refer to APPENDIX 2). 
 
Table 10 Final Cluster Centers 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Reg_norm ,029 ,341 
Exp_life ,394 ,416 
Res_life ,60600 ,58417 
Totassets_NAV 1 0 
Reg_norm (normalized regression coefficients. NAV discount is the dependent 
variable). 
Exp_life (normalized expired lifetime [expired lifetime/total REITs maturity]). 
Res_life (normalized residual lifetime [(tot. maturity – expired lifetime)/expired 
lifetime/ total REITs maturity]). 
Totassets_NAV (REIT manager compensation structure based on total assets [1] 
or NAV figures [0]). 
 
 
Older REITs are characterized by significantly higher coefficients than 
younger REITs, and consistently with an increasing debt trend, REITs with a 
relative shorter residual maturity experience higher market price discounts on 
NAVs, while leverage effects on the NAV discounts of REITs with longer 
residual maturity are less intensive40.  This result seems to be consistent with 
                                                          
40
 Note, however, that the dividing line between “young” and “old” REITs – also 
considering the fact that time values have been normalized – is weak due to the early 
stages of the Italian REIT industry. 
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the previous regression analysis which shows that NAV is positively related 
to debt while market prices are unaffected. Positive debt trends – typical of 
older REITs – therefore lead to higher NAV discounts via increasing NAV 
share valuations. 
 
Surprisingly, REITs that have a management fee structure based on total 
assets experience lower regression coefficients than REITs with NAV-based 
compensation. However, this result needs further investigation in terms of the 
specific provisions that determine fees based on both values, since both 
aggregates (NAV and total assets) positively react to leverage. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The European REITs and comparable investment vehicles are subject to a 
severe prudential regulation aimed to protect retail investors by limiting risk. 
The high regulatory burden is partly offset by a favorable tax-regime. At the 
same time, the shares of REITs often trade at deep discounts from NAV.  
 
This paper explores how the unique regulatory design of REITs and market 
context affect capital structure, and in turn, how REIT share values are 
consequently influenced by the financial decisions of REIT managers. The 
experience of Italian REITs has been analyzed. 
 
Three major controls – common to the experience of REITs in other European 
countries – have been investigated. These are: (1) leverage limitations, (2) 
market price discounts on NAVs, and (3) tax-status. The analysis also 
considers the impact of NAV as the mandatory valuation criterion of REIT 
shares both in the case of assessing “official” share value in annual and semi-
annual reports and new equity offerings. 
 
The persistence of significant NAV discounts faced by a REIT when it would 
like to raise new equity capital makes this type of financing for (assumed 
zero-NPV) investment opportunities unfeasible. Debt issuances (and in very 
limited amounts, retained earnings) remain the only capital source. 
 
How the legal and market constraints influence REIT capital structures 
depend on the valuation perspective adopted and the inherently different 
financial risk perceptions. 
 
From a NAV viewpoint, we argue that the constraints and consequent lack of 
financial alternatives encourage REIT managers to maximize leverage up to 
the allowed debt level. This motivation results from the asset-based valuation 
approach of NAV that basically does not take financial risk into account. Debt 
financing of investment opportunities generally leads to an increase in share 
values measured by NAVs. Individual REIT leverage should therefore show 
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increasing levels over time. Higher leverage ratios are expected to be 
associated with rising NAVs. 
 
From a financial perspective, however, debt effects on capital structures are 
uncertain, and depend on the financial theory that best explains financial 
behavior of REITs. Notwithstanding the capital structure theory applied, 
financial risks associated with the liability structure are captured by market 
prices. Should a REIT wish to pursue an optimal liability configuration, 
regulatory leverage limitations may inhibit its realization. If the leverage ratio 
chosen by the REIT in a constraint free context were higher than the permitted 
leverage ratio, the capital structure would be suboptimal; this in turn, would 
lead to lower share prices than those that would occur in a constraint-free 
environment. If the optimal debt ratio is lower than the regulatory ratio, the 
REIT managers would have to forego investment opportunities in order not to 
alter the optimal WACC. 
 
The key indication is that NAV and financial valuation methodologies 
perceive capital structure and leverage differently.  
 
Market price discounts from NAVs may therefore be at least partly explained 
by the diverse views of financial risk in the valuation methods. 
 
An empirical analysis seems to support these indications in which: 
(1) for the analyzed Italian REIT population, debt ratios tend to increase over 
time for almost all entities; i.e., REITs raise most of their additional funds 
by issuing debt, 
(2) NAV discounts are significantly related to leverage (measured as the debt-
to-asset ratio), 
(3) the discount effect seems largely attributable to NAV increases that result 
from rising debt levels. On the contrary, share market prices tend to be 
independent from leverage. The latter result may indicate – but we cannot 
be certain – that the classic capital theory applies and that current debt 
ratios are still far below critical levels where bankruptcy costs could come 
into play, and 
(4) older REITs tend to show higher correlations between debt and NAV 
discounts than younger REITs. 
 
The results appear to be consistent with our perception that REIT managers 
tend to follow a NAV perspective, regardless of capital structure indications 
as suggested by the financial theory.  
 
The results have significant policy implications in terms of optimal regulatory 
design. 
 
Market constraints combined with existing leverage limitations and a NAV 
valuation methodology have two major effects: (1) they encourage REITs to 
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leverage up to the maximum debt ratio due by limiting or denying their 
resorting to additional equity funding; (2) however, debt maximization 
induced by regulation, generates a compliance risk. It arises in the case of 
market downturns that lower real estate asset values below leverage 
limitations. This could force REITS to sell properties at critical points in time 
at detrimental prices to investors. 
 
Supervisory authorities should therefore reconsider NAV as the mandatory 
share valuation methodology for reporting purposes and establishing values 
for new equity offerings. This would allow public REITs to issue new shares 
at market prices, overcoming the lack of effective financial alternatives to 
debt. However, as long as NAV methodologies are in force, leverage 
restrictions may effectively limit the incentive for REIT managers to 
maximize debt ratios up to critical levels in terms of bankruptcy risk. In this 
sense, limitations protect (retail) investors. If REIT share valuation moved to 
a financial approach, REIT leverage limitations could be maintained if the 
maximum allowed debt ratio were set higher than one that REIT managers 
would choose to optimize capital structure. In that sense, prudential 
limitations could be understood as a cap-level intended to prevent reckless 
financial decisions. However, referring to the Italian experience, there is no 
theoretical or empirical indication that a 60% debt-to-asset ratio is an 
adequate limit. 
 
Caveats: Italian REITs are in the early stages of full development, and 
industry practices and market characteristics are rapidly changing. Data are 
therefore still limited and do not permit definitive results on all issues. 
Moreover, additional factors (such as the provision that new REITs may be 
formed by asset contributions), payout policy, or changes in asset values 
might be considered. Investigations of the role of such factors provide the 
questions for further research.  
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 and
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 Country Belgium France Germany (*) Italy (i) Italy (ii) Netherlands UK 
 Year 1995 2003/2005 2007 1994-1998 2007 1969 2007 
Open-end (***) Yes Yes Yes -- Yes Yes Yes 
Closed-end (***) -- -- -- Yes -- Yes -- 
In terms of fixed 
equity capital 
No. Equity 
issues allowed. 
No. Equity 
issues allowed. 
No. Equity 
issue allowed. 
Yes but equity 
issues allowed 
upon articles of 
association 
No. Equity 
issues allowed. 
Yes but equity 
issues allowed 
upon articles of 
association 
No. Equity 
issues allowed. 
V
e
h
i
c
l
e
 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
In terms of finite 
life 
No. Indefinite 
lifetime. 
De facto no 
(Finite life 
extandable upon 
articles of 
association) 
De facto no 
(Finite life 
extandable upon 
articles of 
association) 
Yes. Finite life. 
De facto no 
(Finite Life 
Extandable 
upon articles of 
association) 
Yes/No (Finite 
or indefinite 
lifetime) 
De facto no 
(Finite life 
extandable upon 
articles of 
association) 
Public Yes (Sicafi) Yes (Siic) Yes (G-Reits) Yes (Fondi Immob.) Yes (Siiq) Yes (FBI) Yes (UK Reits) 
Private -- Yes (Opci) (9) -- Yes -- Yes (FBI) -- 
Minimum 
shareholders 
requirement 
No Yes (4) Yes (5) No Yes (7) Yes Yes (8) 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
L
e
v
e
l
/
R
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
Market 
requirements / 
mandatory listing 
Yes (2) Yes Yes No / Yes  (10) Yes No Yes 
(Continued…)  
Appendix 1 Overview of European REITs: Investment Vehicle's Structure, Market Level, Regulatory Features, and 
Taxation 
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 Country Belgium France Germany (*) Italy (i) Italy (ii) Netherlands UK 
 Year 1995 2003/2005 2007 1994-1998 2007 1969 2007 
Reit's corporate 
level 
De facto pass-
through entities 
De facto pass-
through entities 
De facto pass-
through entities 
De facto pass-
through entities 
De facto pass-
through entities 
(6) 
De facto pass-
through entities 
De facto pass-
through entities 
Mandatory pay out 
rules (**) 
Yes (80% of net 
profit; cap. 
gains not 
subject to 
distrib.) 
Yes (85% of 
tax-exempt 
profits; 50% of 
cap. gains) 
Yes (90% of net 
profit; cap. 
gains deferred 
tax.) 
No/Upon 
articles of 
association 
Yes (85% of 
tax-exempt 
(RE) profits) 
Yes (100%) 
Yes (90% of tax 
-exempt profits; 
cap. gains not 
subject to 
distrib.) 
Reit's corporate 
level [current 
income (CI)/cap. 
gains (CG)] 
(CI)Tax-
exempt/ 
(CG)Tax 
exempt (3) 
(CI)Tax-exempt 
/(CG)Tax 
exempt (3) 
(CI)Tax-exempt 
/(CG) Tax 
exempt (3) 
(CI)Tax-exempt 
/ (CG)Tax 
exempt 
(CI)Tax-exempt 
/ (CG) Taxed 
(CI)Tax-exempt 
/(CG) Tax 
exempt 
(CI)Tax-exempt 
/ (CG)Tax 
exempt (3) 
Investors' level 
taxation- domestic 
corporate inv 
Yes. But 
preferred 
taxation 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes. But 
preferred 
taxation 
Investors' level 
taxation-corporate 
Foreign inv 
No (Certain 
conditions to be 
fulfilled) 
Yes 
(Witholding 
tax) 
Yes 
(Witholding 
Tax) 
No (Certain 
conditions to be 
fulfilled) 
Yes 
(Witholding 
tax) 
Yes 
(Witholding 
tax) 
Yes 
(Witholding 
tax). No tax on 
cap. gains 
T
a
x
a
t
i
o
n
 
Investors' level 
taxation-private inv 
Yes. But 
preferred 
taxation 
(Witholding 
tax) 
Yes/No tax on 
cap. gains 
Yes/No tax on 
cap. gains 
Yes. But 
preferred 
taxation 
(Witholding 
tax) 
Yes. But 
preferred 
taxation 
(Witholding 
tax) (3) 
Yes.But 
preferred 
taxation (3) 
Yes.But 
preferred 
taxation 
(Continued…) 
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 Country Belgium France Germany (*) Italy (i) Italy (ii) Netherlands UK 
 Year 1995 2003/2005 2007 1994-1998 2007 1969 2007 
Reit type 
Corporate type 
(Limited Corp./ 
Partnership) 
Corporate type 
(Stock Corp./ 
Partnership) 
Corporate type 
(Stock Corp.) 
Trust/Investmen
t Fund 
Corporate type 
(Stock Corp.) 
Various types / 
Mainly 
Corporate type 
Corporate type 
(Listed Closed 
End Comp.) 
Mgnt by Trustees / 
Fund Manager 
Mgnt by Ext. 
Fund Manager / 
Int. Mgnt Board 
Int. Mgnt Board Int. Mgnt Board 
Mgnt by 
Trustees / Fund 
Manager 
Mgnt Board 
Mgnt by Ext. 
Fund Manager / 
Int. Mgnt Board 
Internal/ 
External 
Investment 
limitations / 
Income rules 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Leverage 
limitations (**) 
Yes (D/E = 1.1) 
/ D/A=65%; 
Interest exp 
limited to 80% 
of tot. income 
Yes for 
enjoying fiscal 
favorable status 
Yes (D/RE 
assets BV = 
55%) 
Yes (D/RE 
assets MV = 
60%) + (D/Non 
RE assets = 
20%) 
No 
Yes (D/RE 
assets tax BV & 
Non RE asset 
tax BV = 
60%+20%) 
Yes for 
enjoying fiscal 
favorable status R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
F
e
a
t
u
r
e
s
 
 
NAV mandatory as 
share valuation 
method 
No No No Yes No No Yes 
 
Notes: (1) If passive properties holdings. 
 (2) At least 30% of shares have to be offered to the public. 
 (3) Generally referred to as RE investments (see also investment rules). Exceptions may apply. 
 (4) No single shareholder entitled to hold > 60% of share capital; 15% of share capital must be kept by shareholders holding individually < 2%. 
(Appendix 1 Continued) 
Regulatory and Market Constraints of REITs    320 
 
 
R
eg
ulato
ry
 and
 M
ark
et
 C
o
n
straints
 of
 R
EIT
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 320
 
 
 (5) At least 15% (25% at the time of IPO) of share capital must be held on a distributed basis (of those 15%, no individual shareholder is 
entitled to hold > 3%). In general, no individual shareholder is entitled to hold >10%. 
 (6) Based on rental income. Eighty five percent of income must derive from RE rental or leasing. Other requirements apply. 
 (7) No single shareholder entitled to hold > 51% of share capital; 35% must be kept by shareholders holding individually < 1%. 
(8) No single corporate shareholder entitled to hold > 10% of share capital. Other rules and exceptions apply. 
(9) Organisme de Placement Collectif en Immobilier (French non-listed Reits) or Sociètè de Placement à Prèpondèrance Immobilière à Capital Variable (SPPICAV). These vehicles enjoy tax-transaparency. Exceptions apply. 
(10) Mandatory listing if shares have a face value < 25,000 Euro (so called "retail"Reits). 
(*) Note: Reits have only recently been established. Market is dominated by open-end real estate mutual funds that are not included in the table. 
(**) More specific, detailed rules and exceptions apply. 
(***
) 
Note: Open-end / closed-end refers to the substantial classification of the REIT structure, not to the legal form. From a regulatory point of 
view, no REIT is structured as an open-end entity. 
MV Market Value 
 
BV Book Value 
Sources: 
European Public Real Estate Association, EPRA Global REITs Survey - A Comparison of the Mayor REIT Regimes in the World, August 2007 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Global Real Estate Now - Insights, Observations, and Research, March 2007 
Lindberg L., Property Investment Vehicles - An International Comparison, 2002 
Ernst & Young, Global REIT Report - REIT Market Review, October 2007 
Suàrez J.L., Vassallo A., Indirect Investment in Real Estate: Listed Companies and Funds, Iese Business School - University of Navarra, Working 
Paper, July 2005 
Busching T., Germany enters the REIT Universe with a Big Bang, Journal of Retail & Leisure Property, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007 
Gesetz uber Deutsche Immobilien-Aktiengesellschaften mit boersenotierten Anteilen (REIT-Gesetz vom 28. Mai 2007, BGBI I S.914).  
Adaptations by the authors. 
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Appendix 2 Cluster Analysis Details 
Initial Cluster Centers 
  Cluster 
  1 2 
Reg_norm ,106 ,185 
Exp_life ,820 ,420 
Res_life ,18000 ,58000 
Totassets_NAV 1 0 
Reg_norm (normalized regression coefficients. NAV discount is the dependent variable) 
Exp_life (normalized expired lifetime [expired lifetime/total REIT maturity]). 
Res_life (normalized residual lifetime [(total maturity – expired lifetime)/expired 
lifetime/ total REIT maturity]). 
Totassets_NAV (REIT manager compensation structure based on total assets [1] or 
NAV figures [0]). 
 
Iteration History(a) 
Change in Cluster Centers Iteration  1 2 
1 ,616 ,604 
2 ,000 ,000 
A convergence achieved due to no or small changes in cluster centers. The maximum 
absolute coordinate change for any center is ,000. The current iteration is 2. The 
minimum distance between initial centers is 1,525. 
 
Cluster Membership 
Case Number REIT Cluster Distance 
1 1 1 ,359 
2 2 1 ,195 
3 3 1 ,982 
4 4 1 ,127 
5 5 1 ,133 
6 6 1 ,389 
7 7 2 ,604 
8 8 2 ,704 
9 9 2 ,614 
10 10 2 ,635 
11 11 2 ,780 
12 12 2 ,470 
13 13 2 ,447 
14 14 1 ,349 
15 15 1 ,117 
16 16 2 ,429 
17 17 2 ,473 
18 18 1 ,616 
19 19 2 ,596 
20 20 1 ,172 
21 21 2 ,579 
22 22 2 ,489 
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Final Cluster Centers 
  
Cluster 
  
1 2 
Reg_norm ,029 ,341 
Exp_life ,394 ,416 
Res_life ,60600 ,58417 
Totassets_NAV 1 0 
 
Distances between Final Cluster Centers 
Cluster 1 2 
1   1,095 
2 1,095   
 
Number of Cases in Each Cluster 
1 10,000 
Cluster 
2 12,000 
Valid 22,000 
Missing ,000 
 
